Dennett argues that we can be mistaken about our own conscious experience. Despite this, he repeatedly asserts that we can or do have unchallengeable authority of some sort in our reports about that experience. This assertion takes three forms. First, Dennett compares our authority to the authority of an author over his fictional world.
Several times in his 1991 book, Consciousness Explained, Dennett likens our authority in our statements about our conscious experience to an author's authority over a work of fiction:
As in fiction, what the author (the apparent author) says goes. More precisely, what the apparent author says provides a text that … goes to stipulate the way a certain "world" is. We don't ask how Conan Doyle came to know the color of Holmes's easy chair, and we don't raise the possibility that he might have got it wrong; we do correct typographical errors and put the best, most may be the best authority, but we go too far if we say that there is no way ever to correct you. Suppose you report that there's a flower there with a certain internal structure that you describe in some detail. Unbeknownst to you, very similar flowers grow on betterknown islands nearby. A consensus of experts has noted that all previously observed flowers of that genus have an internal structure very much like the one you reported, but different in one key feature. Compelling theoretical reasons exist to suppose little species-to-species variation in that feature and no significant likelihood of mutation in that direction. Furthermore, there's an easy psycho-perceptual explanation of how an amateur could erroneously misperceive such a feature. Weighing all these facts, the most reasonable thing may be to correct your report, even over your strenuous objection.
Strictly speaking, then, your report is "corrigible" after all.
Why shouldn't the same be true for our reports of our experience? Dennett In sum: I want to read Dennett as saying (as I say) that there are facts about conscious experience, and that people often get these facts wrong, even when it's their own ongoing conscious experience at issue; and that although (obviously) each of us stands in some special relationship to her own experience, that special relationship confers upon us no unchallengeable authority about it. Dennett puzzles me when he asserts, on the contrary, that we can have some unchallengable authority, despite our aptitude for error and the apparent availability of methods for outsiders to detect and correct those errors. Perhaps he only means that we have the kind of authority a witness has over her testimony, which is to say no authority at all over the events described, only authority over one's description of them. But Dennett seems to want something stronger than that when he (1.) likens the authority to an author's authority over his fictional creations, where there is no possibility of factual error because there are no real-world facts being reported, (2.) claims that subjects "must" be right in their sincere reports about "what it's like", and (3.) claims that subjects' reports about their experiences can be "incorrigible" in Rorty's sense. 
